

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03

NSAE-00 NSC-07 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-03 SS-20

USIA-15 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 IO-14 OIC-04 AEC-11 OMB-01

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P R 100910Z MAY 74

FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2714

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 VIENNA 4155

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: WESTERN PLENARY STATEMENT OF
10 MAY 74

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE PLENARY PRESENTATION TO
BE MADE BY THE NETHERLANDS REP ON 10 MAY.

BEGIN TEXT.

1. TODAY WE ARE BEGINNING THE THIRD ROUND OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS.
WE HOPE THAT IN THIS ROUND IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO MAKE SOME
REAL PROGRESS TOWARD OUR GOAL OF ACHIEVING AGREEMENT ON THE
REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND ASSOCIATED MEASURES
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IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT THE ROUND OF

NEGOTIATIONS WHICH BEGINS TODAY WILL BE OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE.

2. THE TWO ROUNDS WHICH HAVE PRECEDED THIS ONE HAVE BEEN USEFUL. BOTH SIDES HAVE LAID OUT THEIR POSITIONS. EACH SIDE HAS HAD A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLORE THE POSITION OF THE OTHER. THIS PROCESS OF EXPOSITION AND EXPLORATION HAS BEEN A NECESSARY PREREQUISITE TO PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. AS A RESULT OF IT, WE NOW HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S VIEWPOINTS.

3. SINCE OUR LAST MEETING, MY COLEAGUES AND I HAVE GIVEN FURTHER THOUGHT TO THE MAIN ISSUES WHICH HAVE BEEN RAISED HERE. WE HAVE REFLECTED CAREFULLY ON WHAT EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE SAID, BOTH ABOUT THEIR APPROACH AND ABOUT OUR OWN. IN CONSIDERING THESE POINTS, MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE SOUGHT TO KEEP BEFORE US THE AGREED GOAL OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS -- A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP AND STRENGTHENED PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

4. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE PROPOSALS WE HAVE PRESENTED PROVIDE THE BEST APPROACH TO ACHIEVING THIS GOAL, AND THE MOST PRACTICAL WAY OF BRINING THESE NEGOTIATIONS TO A POSITIVE OUTCOME.

5. THE WESTERN APPROACH AIRMS, IN THE MOST DIRECT AND STRAIGHT-FORWARD WAY, AT STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT OFFERS A RELATIVELY SIMPLE, PRACTICAL SOLUTION TO A COMPLEX PROBLEM, AND AT THE SAME TIME EACH OF ITS PRINCIPAL FEATURES CONTRIBUTES DIRECTLY TO THIS UNDERLYING AIRM.

6. TO ACHIEVE GREATER STABILITY MEANS IN OUR VIEW TO ELIMINATE THE MAIN SOURCE OF INSTABILITY IN THE AREA -- NAMELY, THE IMBALANCE IN GROUND FORCES. THAT IS WHY WE HAVE PROPOSED A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AS THE OVERALL GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. WE SEE NO SIMPLER, MORE EFFECTIVE WAY THAN THIS TO ACHIEVE GREATER STABILITY.

7. WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT THIS GOAL BE APPROACHED IN TWO PHASES OF NEGOTIATIONS, EACH OF WHICH WOULD CULMINATE IN A SEPARATE CONFIDENTIAL

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AGREEMENT. IN THE FIRST PHASE, PARTICIPANTS WOULD REACH AGREEMENT ON REDUCTION OF US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND ON THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT. IN THE SECOND PHASE, PARTICIPANTS WOULD AGREE ON FURTHER REDUCTIONS RESULTING IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. IN THIS SECOND PHASE, THE GROUND FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE INCLUDED. THE PHASED APPROACH WE HAVE PROPOSED IS A PRACTICAL ONE. EQUALLY IMPORTANT, IT

WOULD ENHANCE STABILITY WITHOUT DIMINISHING THE SECURITY OF ANY PARTICIPANTS. FOR PARTICIPANTS OTHER THAN THE US AND SOVIET UNION TO REDUCE THEIR FORCES REQUIRES A CLIMATE OF MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. THAT IS WHY WE BELIEVE THAT THESE TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD CREATE THE NECESSARY CONFIDENCE IN THE TROOP REDUCTION PROCESS THROUGH THEIR OWN PRIOR EXAMPLE.

8. THE FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS WE HAVE PROPOSED CALL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GDR OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY, CONSISTING OF FIVE DIVISIONS, INCLUDING SOME 68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS AND 1,700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS. SUCH A WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD REDUCING THE EXISTING DISPARITIES IN THE GROUND FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IT WOULD BE A FIRST MOVE TOWARD ACHIEVING A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA, AND WOULD REDUCE THE HEAVY EASTERN SUPERIORITY OF 9,500 TANKS, A PREPONDERANCE WHICH IS OF LEGITIMATE CONCERN TO THE WEST. ON BOTH THESE COUNTS, THE WITHDRAWALS WE HAVE PROPOSED WOULD CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO INCREASED STABILITY.

9. FOR ITS PART, THE WEST WOULD WITHDRAW 29,000 US SOLDIERS. THEY WOULD BE WITHDRAWN AS INDIVIDUALS OR IN UNITS, AND THEIR EQUIPMENT COULD BE STORED AND MAINTAINED IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS.

10. THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN WORKING TO ENHANCE STABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE, IF STABILITY WERE DECREASED ELSEWHERE AS A RESULT. FOR THIS REASON WE HAVE PROPOSED THAT, IN ANY AGREEMENT REACHED, THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS SHOULD NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF THE COUNTRIES PARTICIPATING WITH A SPECIAL STATUS.

11. WE HAVE REPEATEDLY STRESSED THE IMPORTANT AND CONFIDENTIAL

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NECESSARY CONTRIBUTION WHICH APPROPRIATE ASSOCIATED MEASURES -- INCLUDING STABILIZING MEASURES, VERIFICATION AND NON-CIRCUMVENTION -- WILL MAKE TO MAINTAINING STABILITY AND CONFIDENCE IN THE CONTINUING VIABILITY OF ANY REDUCTION AGREEMENT. SO FAR, WE HAVE PRESENTED DETAILED PROPOSALS FOR FOUR STABILIZING MEASURES DESIGNED TO CONTRIBUTE TO THESE PURPOSES. WE SHALL IN DUE COURSE PRESENT FURTHER PROPOSALS ON ASSOCIATED MEASURES.

12. MR. CHAIRMAN, I HAVE SUMMARIZED VERY BRIEFLY WHAT OUR POSITION IS AND WHY WE CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN IT. WE REMAIN CONVINCED THAT IT REPRESENTS THE MOST PRACTICAL AND MOST EFFECTIVE APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION OF THE SECURITY PROBLEM WHICH THESE NEGOTIATIONS ARE INTENDED TO RESOLVE. WE HOPE TO PERSUADE ALL PARTICIPANTS OF THE MERITS OF

OUR POINT OF VIEW.

13. FROM THIS POINT OF VIEW, WE FIND THE EASTERN APPROACH UNWIELDY AND IMPRACTICAL. IT DEMANDS THAT ALL PARTICIPANTS REDUCE SIMULTANEOUSLY, IN ALL REDUCTION STAGES. IT DEMANDS THAT ALL TYPES OF FORCES BE REDUCED. AND IT REQUIRES THAT ALL OF THESE DECISIONS, RELATING TO REDUCTION STAGES, BE TAKEN IN A SINGLE PHASE OF

NOTE BY OC/T: ACDE NOT INCLUDED ON SECTION 2, VIENNA 4155, BECAUSE CIRCUIT WAS NOT OPERATING.

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ACTION ACDA-19

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CIAE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

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P R 100901Z MAY 74
FM AMEMBASSY VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2715
SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 VIENNA 4155

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS; FROM US REP MBFR

NEGOTIATIONS. THESE ARE TOO MANY PROBLEMS TO RESOLVE IN A FIRST AGREEMENT. WE FIND OUR APPROACH MORE WORKABLE.

14. MOREOVER, THE EASTERN APPROACH WOULD NOT RESULT IN AN IMPROVEMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE. BY PERPETUATING THE EXISTING FORCE RATIOS AT LOWER FORCE

LEVELS, IT WOULD ACTUALLY WORSEN THE SITUATION. THUS, EVEN IF IT WERE A WORKABLE APPROACH, IT WOULD NOT IN OUR VIEW PROVIDE AN EQUITABLE GOAL.

15. BY CONTRAST, THE WESTERN APPROACH IS A SELECTIVE ONE, AND, WE BELIEVE, A MORE PRACTICAL ONE. IT FOCUSES ON REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES. IN THE FIRST PHASE, ONLY US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED. MORE DIFFICULT ISSUES RELATING TO THE REDUCTION OF THE GROUND FORCES OF OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WOULD BE ADDRESSED IN A SECOND PHASE, ONE THE CONFIDENTIAL

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NECESSARY CONDITIONS OF CONFIDENCE HAD BEEN CREATED. MOREOVER, THE WESTERN APPROACH AIMS AT IMPROVING THE EXISTING SECURITY SITUATION THROUGH ESTABLISHMENT OF A COMMON CEILING ON GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. IN SUM, THE WESTERN APPROACH IS BOTH PRACTICAL AND CONSTRUCTIVE.

16. AS I SAID EARLIER, WE HAVE FOUND THE DISCUSSIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN HELD SO FAR USEFUL. VIEWPOINTS HAVE BEEN CLARIFIED. PARTICIPANTS UNDERSTAND EACH OTHER BETTER. IN THIS SENSE, A MODEST AMOUNT OF CONCEPTUAL PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. THERE HAS, HOWEVER, BEEN NO PROGRESS ON THE ACTUAL SUBSTANCE.

17. NOW, IN THIS THIRD ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS, IT IS TIME TO START MAKING SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS. WE BELIEVE THAT MUCH OF THE GROUNDWORK FOR THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN LAID. IN HIS STATEMENT ON APRIL 9, AT THE CLOSE OF THE PREVIOUS ROUND, MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE POINTED TO CERTAIN ELEMENTS OF COMMON GROUND WHICH HAD EMERGED, WHICH WE WILL TRY AND ENLARGE AND ON WHICH BOTH SIDES SHOULD BE ABLE TO BUILD.

18. LET ME REMIND YOU OF WHAT THOSE ARE: FIRST, BOTH SIDES APPEAR TO AGREE ON THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF TAKING STEPS TO MAKE ANY CONFLICT LESS LIKELY, AND THUS ALSO REDUCE THE RISK OF NUCLEAR CONFLICT. SECOND, THERE MAY BE SOME COMMON GROUND WITH RESPECT TO PHASING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND REDUCTIONS. THIRD, WE HAVE NOTED THAT BOTH OF THE APPROACHES WHICH HAVE BEEN PUT FORWARD IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, US AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES WOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. FOURTH, BOTH SIDES APPEAR TO AGREE ON THE CARDINAL IMPORTANCE OF STRENGTHENING THE SECURITY OF ALL NINETEEN PARTICIPANTS. IN THIS CONTEXT, THEY ALSO APPEAR TO AGREE THAT, AS A RESULT OF FORCE REDUCTIONS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, TENSIONS SHOULD NOT BE SHIFTED TO THE FLANK COUNTRIES. FINALLY, BOTH SIDES SEEM TO WISH TO COME TO PRACTICAL RESULTS IN THE MOST EXPEDITIOUS WAY.

19. AS REGARDS THE LAST POINT, EASTERN PARTICIPANTS HAVE SAID THEY WISH TO BEGIN IMPLEMENTATION OF REDUCTIONS IN 1975. WE TOO ARE PREPARED TO WORK TOWARD THIS GOAL. BUT TO ACHIEVE

IT, WE NEED TO BEGIN MAKING SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS TOWARD A SATISFACTORY AGREEMENT NOW. THE PRIORITY PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED IS THE PROBLEM OF WHAT SPECIFIC LIMITED STEPS SHOULD BE
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TAKEN IN ORDER T MOVE THE NEGOTIATIONS AHDEAD.

20. HOW SHOULD WE GO ABOUT TRYING TO ACHIEVE THIS? CERTAINLY, IT WILL NOT BE AN EASY PROCESS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE HAD THUS FAR HAVE DEMONSTRATED AT LEAST ONE POINT VERY CLEARLY: THAT IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO RESOLVE ALL QUESTIONS BEARING ON FORCE REDUCTIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY. WE WILL NEED TO BE SELEVTIVE, TAKING CERTAIN STEPS FIRST AND OTHERS LATER.

21. TO MAKE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, WE PROPOSE THEREFORE THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD IDENTIFY THOSE ASPECTS OF THE OVERALL PROBLEM MOST SUSCEPTIBLE TO EARLY SOLUTION. THEY SHOULD FOCUS ON MEASURES AIMED AT RESOLVING THOSE PROBLEMS IN THE MOST EFFECTIVE MANNER. AND THEY SHOULD FOLLOW A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH, DEFINING KEY ISSUES IN A WAY THAT WILL MAKE THEM MANAGEABLE, AND RESOLVING THEM ONE BY ONE, IN PROPER SEQUENCE. IN OUR VIEW, THE WESTERN APPROACH POINTS THE WAY.

22. THE KIND OF SUBSTANTIVE PROGRESS WHICH WE HOPE WILL BE ACHIEVED IN THIS THIRD ROUND OF NEGOTIATIONS CAN, WE BELIEVE, BE PURSUED MOST PRACTICALLY BY GIVING PRIORITY ATTENTION TO THIS ISSUE, NAMELY, WHAT COUNTRIES SHOULD REDUCE THEIR FORCES INITIALLY? IF WE CAN RESOLVE THIS ISSUE, WE WILL HAVE MADE CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS TOWARD AGREEMENT.

23. WE BELIEVE THAT PARTICIPANTS SHOULD AGREE IN PRINCIPLE THAT ONLY US AND SOVIET FORCES WILL BE REDUCED IN A FIRST PHASE. DECISION OF PRINCIPLE ALONG THESE LINES WOULD REPRESENT A VERY IMPORTANT PRACTICAL STEP FORWARD. AND WE HOPE, MR. CHAIRMAN, THAT IT WILL PROVE POSSIBLE TO TAKE THIS FORWARD STEP WHICH WILL ALLOW US TO MOVE ON TO RESOLVE OTHER QUESTIONS, END TEXT. HUMES

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